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THE INFERENCE FROM AUTHORITY TO INTERPRETIVE METHOD IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DOMAINS 
Kevin M. Stackt 
42 See irifra Richard Primus, The Constitutional Constant. 
t Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. I am grateful to Chris Serkin for
helpful comments. 
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1649
Should courts interpret the Constitution as they interpret
statutes? This question has been answered in a wide variety of
ways. On the one hand, many scholars and jurists understand
constitutional and statutory interpretation as largely overlap-
ping, continuous, or converging. For some, this overlap follows
directly from the Constitution's status as a form of legislated
law.4 3 In this way of thinking, because the Constitution, like a
statute, was bargained over and formally adopted, it should be
interpreted in accordance with general principles applicable to
legislated law.44 Proponents of this view argue that if constitu-
tional interpretation appears distinctive in practice, that is be-
cause it involves the application "of usual principles" to "an
unusual text," not because special principles apply.4 5 For
others, the commonality between constitutional and statutory
interpretation follows from more general commitments about
the character of law. The premise, for instance, that the funda-
mental imperative for courts is to make decisions-whether
constitutional, statutory, or common law-that align with con-
temporary values renders constitutional, statutory, and com-
mon law methodology continuous.4 6
On the other hand, many embrace interpretive and meth-
odological pluralism, including divergence between constitu-
43 Legislated law, including statutory law and written constitutions, is ex-
pressly and intentionally made to change the law. See John Gardner, Some Types
of Law, in COMMON LAw THEORY 51 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007).
44 See, e.g., JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITEN LAWS AND
THEIR INTERPRETATION § 92, 80 (1882) ("Our constitutions, being, like statutes,
written instruments and laws, are, in the main, similarly interpreted." (internal
citations omitted)); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 37-40 (1997) (explaining that a "common-law way of making law" is
"not the way of construing a democratically adopted text," and noting that statu-
tory rule that "a text does not change would apply a fortiori to a constitution").
John Manning also argues that the fact that the Constitution, like a statute,
represents a settlement and compromise mitigates against the adoption of consti-
tutional doctrines, such as federalism and separation of powers, which are not
readily tied to particular provisions of the Constitution. See John F. Manning,
Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARv.
L. REv. 2003, 2007-10, 2040 (2009); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers As
Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARv. L. REv. 1939, 1943, 1947 (2011).
45 SCAUA, supra note 44, at 37 (noting that constitutional interpretation "is
distinctive, not because special principles of interpretation apply, but because the
usual principles are being applied to an unusual text").
46 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.
PA. L. REv. 1479, 1479 (1987) (contesting firm distinctions among statutory, com-
mon law, and constitutional interpretation; and positing that all should be inter-
preted dynamically); Ernest A. Young, The Continuity of Statutory and
Constitutional Interpretation An Essay for Phil Frickey, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1371,
1384 (2010) (arguing that the Legal Process School's conception of statutory
purpose, incorporating recourse to more fundamental purposes of public law
"effectively renders statutory and constitutional [interpretation] continuous").
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tional and statutory interpretation. Defenders of interpretive
pluralism, of which I am one of many,4 7 also come in different
types. For some, pluralism follows from views about the au-
thority of different types of law or their distinctive roles in the
legal system.4 8 For others, practical considerations of institu-
tional competence, not first principles, justify divergence in
interpretive method.49 In this vein, many go a step further and
argue that interpretive method also depends on the institu-
tional position and capacities of the official doing the interpret-
ing-that is, that the lower court, the Supreme Court, the
President, and the administrative agency do not (or should not)
have identical approaches to interpretation.5 0
47 See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory
Interpretation, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (2004) (arguing that neither originalism
nor dynamic approaches to interpretation should be the same when applied to the
Constitution and statutes); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 355, 356-65 (2012) (defending an interpretive method for regulatory inter-
pretation based on the distinctive legal character and legal function of regula-
tions); Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch How Agencies
Interpret Statutes, 109 Nw. U. L. REV. 871, 873-81 (2015) (arguing that agency
statutory interpretation is guided by different norms than judicial statutory inter-
pretation). Many scholars defend a difference in constitutional and statutory (and
common law) modes of interpretation; these issues are directly explicated and
carefully considered in Kent Greenawalt's books on public law interpretation, as
part of his three-volume exploration of legal interpretation. See KENT GREENAWALT,
STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION (2013) (comparing statutory and com-
mon law interpretation, including contrast between agency and judicial forms of
statutory interpretation); KENT GREENAWALT, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 5
(2015) ("The similarity of statutes and constitutions [as forms of legislated law]
does not entail that whatever represents ound statutory interpretation applies to
interpreting a constitution. Any such equation would be deeply mistaken."); see
also Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 267, 271 (Jules Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., 2002) (arguing for difference in constitutional and statutory inter-
pretation); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 212-13 (2006) (arguing
that agencies should draw on a wider array of interpretive tools than courts given
their different capacities).
48 See, e.g., Scorr J. SHAPIRO, LEGALIY 357-59 (2011) (arguing that interpre-
tive approach, for each set of officials, follows from their relative place in society's
economy of trust); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Defer-
ence: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
501, 501-04 (2005) (observing and offering a defense of difference in agency and
judicial statutory interpretation).
49 See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and
Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REv. 885, 885-90 (2003) (exploring how institutional
capacities shape the way certain institutions interpret certain texts).
50 See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Ap-
peals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 317, 327-51 (2005) (arguing that strong horizontal
stare decisis in statutory cases should not apply in lower courts); Aaron-Andrew
P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97
CORNELL L. REv. 433, 439 (2012) (arguing that different norms apply to lower
courts and the Supreme Court when interpreting statutes); see also Stack,
Purposivism in the Executive Branch, supra note 47, at 873-81 (citing literature on
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Christopher Serkin and Nelson Tebbe's article, Is the Con-
stitution Special?,5 1 is a welcome addition to this long-running
debate over the character of our constitutionalism. Their arti-
cle has two basic elements. First, it carefully and compactly
chronicles differences in the interpretive norms (which they call
arguments) applied by courts when faced with statutory and
constitutional questions. Serkin and Tebbe's thoughtful ac-
count of the dimensions of divergence in current law and prac-
tice is likely to inspire many forms of engagement.52 Second,
their article argues that these observed differences are not jus-
tified, and more generally, they contend that the case for diver-
gence in constitutional and statutory interpretation has not
been made.
In this essay, I focus on their second claim that divergence
in interpretive approach between the Constitution and statutes
is not-or has not yet been-justified. To defend this claim,
Serkin and Tebbe's primary strategy is to isolate characteris-
tics of the Constitution and constitutional law, and argue these
characteristics do not, individually or collectively, justify the
distinctive norms of constitutional interpretation that we ob-
serve. They consider a wide collection of attributes of the Con-
stitution, including the generality of many of its terms, the fact
that the Constitution includes broad aspirational principles
(e.g. equal protection), the Constitution's relative entrench-
ment from express amendment, its legal supremacy, demo-
cratic legitimacy, and its merits and symbolic place in
American self-understanding. Acknowledging that this is not a
comprehensive set of characteristics or considerations that
might differentiate the Constitution and statutes, their article
ultimately relies upon a more general skepticism that under-
standings of the Constitution's authority "translate directly, or
even particularly well into interpretive strategies."53 The Con-
stitution's "[aluthority," they argue, "has less to do with argu-
ment than many suppose," and it "underdetermines
arguing that agencies and courts interpret statutes under different norms and
defending the view).
51 Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 COR-
NELL L. REv. 701 (2016).
52 See, for a start, Richard Primus, The Cost of Text, supra (offering an expla-
nation of the observed divergence).
53 Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 51, at 768 (endorsing general view skepticism
about the connection between constitutional authority and interpretation in con-
text of evaluating perfectionist arguments for the Constitution's authority); see
also id. at 773-74 (embracing the same skepticism about argument for the Con-
stitution's authority as central to American self-understanding and interpretive
method).
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interpretation."5 4 In the end, Serkin and Tebbe allow that
some argument from the Constitution's authority might justify
a particular interpretive approach,5 5 but they do not think the
case has been made.56
Serkin and Tebbe's article, in company with prior scholar-
ship,5 7 raises a fundamental question about how much con-
straint conceptions of constitutional authority impose on
constitutional interpretation. But to reach their further con-
clusion that the case for divergence in constitutional and statu-
tory interpretation has not been made requires a comparison of
the grounds of authority of the Constitution, on the one hand,
and statutes, on the other. Even if arguments from authority
do not dictate particular interpretive approaches, I argue that
comparing the grounds of the authority of the Constitution and
statutory law still suggests differences in the methods of con-
stitutional and statutory interpretation.
One note of clarification at the outset: I treat Serkin and
Tebbe's positions only in reference to constitutional and statu-
tory interpretation by the Supreme Court; that excludes inter-
pretive practices by other courts and other officials. This
limitation is important. There are strong arguments that inter-
pretive practice varies among the Supreme and lower courts, in
state courts, as well as among executive officials. Limiting the
evaluation to interpretation in the Supreme Court isolates the
comparison between constitutional and statutory interpreta-
tion without confounding factors relating to the institutional
stance of the interpreter.
I
To see how a comparison in the authority of the Constitu-
tion and statutes might support an argument for interpretive
divergence, consider the following premises:
1. The Constitution (and constitutional law) and statutes
(and statutory law) have distinct grounds of authority as
well as distinct roles in our legal system.
2. The differences in the grounds of authority and legal roles
of the Constitution (and constitutional law) and statutes
54 Id. at 773.
5s Id. at 774.
56 Id. at 775.
57 See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 640-69 (2008) (grappling with theories of constitu-
tional authority and their connection to interpretive method).
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(and statutory law) make a difference to how the Court
should interpret these two forms of law.
By authority, I mean an account of what explains the respect
courts and others accord that form of law, and by role, I mean
an account of the functions the form of law paradigmatically
serves in the legal system. I address the reasons for the paren-
thetical inclusion of "constitutional law" and "statutory law"
below.58
These premises generalize a principle articulated by Jo-
seph Raz. Raz writes, "[a] principle of constitutional theory that
commands widespread support says that the principles of con-
stitutional interpretation depend in part on the theory of con-
stitutional authority."59 The generalization is that norms of
interpretation, not only norms of constitutional interpretation,
depend in part on the authority of the type of law at issue.6 0
Tebbe and Serkin are skeptical about this generalized princi-
ple. One way to address that skepticism is to defend the two
premises indented above. Those premises, if valid, justify di-
vergence in interpretive approach to the Constitution and stat-
utes-and might, one would hope, also shed light on the
precise divergence that Serkin and Tebbe observe in current
law.
To defend the first premise requires identifying grounds for
the authority of the Constitution and statutes. Notice that not
all characteristics or features of the Constitution also make
claims to be a ground for the Constitution's authority. For
instance, the generality of the Constitution's terms makes the
Constitution unusual, though not unique, but generality does
not itself provide a ground for why we owe the Constitution
respect.6 1 Likewise, the fact that the Constitution contains as-
pirational principles neither distinguishes it from statutes,6 2
nor provides a ground for its authority. Among the characteris-
tics of the Constitution isolated in Serkin and Tebbe's analysis,
58 See infra Part IV.
s9 Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some
Preliminaries, in CONSTITuTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 157 (Larry
Alexander ed., 1998).
60 See Stack, Divergence, supra note 47, at 56 (defending this generalization
of Raz's principle).
61 Though, as Primus argues, on different grounds, generality does make a
difference to the constraints that text impose on interpretation. See Primus, The
Cost of Text, supra note 52, at 6-7 & n.2; see also Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 51,
at 751-53 (rejecting that the Constitution's often broad and general wording
justifies its interpretive exceptionalism because the Constitution displays prolix-
ity at times and certain statutes also display broad and general wording).
62 See Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 51, at 752.
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the two most promising candidates that could be grounds for
authority fall under the general mantles of (i) democratic legiti-
macy, and (ii) stability and continuity.63 We view the demo-
cratic mandate or claim of democratic endorsement of a law as
a reason to abide by it; and so too, law's role in creating con-
tinuity and stability in society also provides a reason to respect
it.6 4 Focusing on these two grounds for authority, the question
is whether the Constitution and statutes part company in ways
that make a difference to their interpretation.
II
First consider claims to democratic authority. As Paul
Kahn observes, claims of democratic authority involve claims
to represent a popular body.6 5 If this is correct, then the demo-
cratic authority of the Constitution and statutory law are deriv-
ative of their underlying claims of representation.
But the body the Constitution claims to represent cannot
be the same as the body represented by statutory law. Statu-
tory law claims to represent and derive its authority from the
legislative majority, and through it, the popular majority. The
possibility of repeal or amendment of any statute gives existing
as well as recently enacted statutory law a claim to represent
the legislative majority. To be sure, many features of our sys-
tem complicate and undermine the extent to which enacting
coalitions reflect the popular majority or even the legislative
majority. The current campaign financing regime, redistricting
practices, veto-gates in the legislature (including super-major-
ity thresholds for bill consideration), in addition to competition
for scarce legislative time and resources, etc., make it more
difficult to draw direct lines between enacting coalitions, legis-
lative majorities, and the popular majority.
63 Tebbe and Serkin note that the Constitution is superior to statutes in the
sense of overriding statutes in the case of conflict. The fact that the Constitution
is superior to other laws is part of what defines it as a constitution, see Raz, supra
note 59, at 153, but that feature does not provide a ground for its authority.
Serkin and Tebbe's interesting arguments about entrenchment I treat as part of
my discussion of stability and continuity values. The perfectionist arguments do
make claims as grounds for the Constitution's authority. I do not find them the
most convincing grounds for constitutional authority, see Stack, Divergence,
supra note 47, at 27-28, and so I pass over them here in favor of a focus on
democratic legitimacy and stability and continuity.
E4 Cf. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 37-39 (2010) (identifying
command theories and common law approaches, rough cognates to my consider-
ations of democracy and stability and continuity, as two traditions for under-
standing law).
65 PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF AMERICA 198 (1997).
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Even allowing that statutory law is imperfectly
majoritarian, it is clear that the Constitution's claim to re-
present a popular body cannot be a claim to represent the
legislative majority. A basic element of our constitutional
scheme is that the Constitution may check and invalidate the
majority as expressed in legislation. The Constitution's demo-
cratic authority therefore presupposes that it represents a dif-
ferent democratic body, a different demos, than the legislative
majority.
Who, then, does the Constitution claim to represent?
Some constitutional theorists argue that the Constitution rep-
resents the past supermajorities who enacted and ratified its
text, intending to entrench its provisions against change
through normal lawmaking processes. As a ground for demo-
cratic authority, these views face familiar objections, of the type
Serkin and Tebbe discuss, that they necessarily privilege the
preferences of prior generations over current majorities (the
dead hand problem).66 In response, other constitutional theo-
rists argue that the body the Constitution represents cannot be
reduced to any moments of historical consent, but rather is an
intergenerational body that defines "our 'fundamental nature
as a people.'"6 7 From this perspective, the Constitution claims
to represent an abstract body, a body which exists now or
existed in the past "under the rule of a particular political-legal
order."68 No doubt there is significant work to be done to ex-
plain how such a democratic subject makes a claim of author-
ity over us. Perhaps the hope of a democratic basis for the
Constitution's authority is ultimately wistful. But the basic
point remains that whether one simply views past supermajori-
ties or an inter-temporal subject as the body represented by the
Constitution, statutory law and the Constitution have different
sources of democratic authority because they claim to re-
present different democratic bodies.
Turning to the second premise, what implications do these
different claims of democratic authority have for statutory and
constitutional interpretation? Adam Samaha, who is a skeptic
about the relationship between constitutional authority and in-
66 See Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 51, at 766; see also Samaha, supra note
57, at 616-25 (discussing dead hand arguments).
67 Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS
13, 24 (1990) (quoting Hanna Fenichel Pitkln, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 167, 169 (1987)); see JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 61, 153-54
(2001); see also Stack, Divergence, supra note 47, at 35-42 (discussing views of
the democratic subject of the Constitution).
68 RUBENFELD, supra note 67, at 153.
1674 [Vol. 102:1649
terpretation, is not worried about the authority-interpretation
inference in the context of statutory interpretation. Concep-
tions of the authority of legislation, he writes, "might logically
guide statutory interpretation."69 I agree; statutory authority
provides some direction to statutory interpretation. Consider a
statute's democratic character: the statute represents the leg-
islative majority and ultimately the popular majority through
discrete moments of authorization. In an election, the authori-
zation flows from the popular majority to the elected officials,
and then in the moment of statutory enactment, from the
elected officials to the law. The statute's representative and
democratic character is defined by these moments of authori-
zation. This makes a difference to statutory interpretation: it
justifies interpreting statutes in a way that attends carefully to
the statutory text enacted and to the statute's stated and pub-
lic aims. Moreover, the courts' (and especially the Supreme
Court's) statutory interpretations remain accountable to the
current legislative majority; if Congress disagrees with the
Court's interpretation, it can make corrections.70
In contrast, the body the Constitution represents is not
identified with an ongoing federal institution, like the legisla-
ture, and judicial interpretations face little practical prospect of
override. The Constitution's representation of a popular body
thus has a more symbolic character; the Constitution repre-
sents its demos whether conceived as past supermajorities or
an intergenerational people less through discrete moments of
authorization, which an existing body can monitor and call
back, than by standing for the people it represents.7 1 We (the
People) are constituted and symbolized by the Constitution; as
Serkin and Tebbe observe, the Constitution has a uniqueness
as a cultural symbol, in part because our political-legal order is
identified with the existence of our Constitution.72
69 Samaha, supra note 57, at 637.
70 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpre-
tation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 331-43 (1991) (documenting the congres-
sional practice of overriding Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions); cf.
Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in
Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 860-66 (2012) (documenting how the
Supreme Court will reinvigorate precedent that Congress has overridden).
71 See HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 39-43, 101-03
(1967) (discussing representation as authorization and as symbolic 'standing for');
KAHN, REIGN OF LAW, supra note 65, at 199, 218.
72 See Primus, The Cost of Text, supra note 52, at 11 (noting that American
lawyers frame issues of significance in constitutional terms).
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Serkin and Tebbe view "[rlemarkably little" as following
from the Constitution's distinctive status as a symbol.7 3 But
comparing the symbolic character of the Constitution's repre-
sentation of its subject with that of statutory law sets constitu-
tional and statutory interpretation on different paths. In the
constitutional domain, to claim democratic authority, interpre-
tation must itself play a role in identifying and sustaining a
connection with the body that the Constitution claims to re-
present. It is from this perspective that Robert Post observes,
the authority of the Constitution "does not flow from the ante-
cedent nature of the Constitution, but rather from the particu-
lar relationship we have forged with the Constitution" through
interpretation.7 4 The symbolic character of the democratic
subject the Constitution claims to represent places a burden
on constitutional interpretation of setting forth principles that
the people can view as their own.' 5 This is not to say that
background values play no role in statutory interpretation;
they do.7 6 In the statutory case, courts may check the prospec-
tive interpretation against background principles. But statu-
tory interpretation does not have the same narrative burden of
articulating principles in a way that makes sense of, and ulti-
mately constitutes, our collective commitments as a people.
From this perspective, important elements of the diver-
gence Serkin and Tebbe observe in how courts treat these
forms of law fall into place. In particular, the greater attention
to text in statutory interpretation makes sense given the direct-
ness of the claim of democratic authorization of statutory text.
Further, the elaboration of the Constitution's requirements
through a body of law that remains at a considerable distance
from the Constitution's text provides a means of articulating
and updating principles that the people can identify as their
own. In short, representation through authorization privileges
text, whereas symbolic representation privileges persuasion
through judicial narrative. Comparison of the grounds of dem-
73 Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 51, at 773.
74 Post, supra note 67, at 29; see also Paul W. Kahn & Kiel Brennan-Marquez,
Statutes and Democratic Self-Authorship, 56 WM. & MARY L. REv. 115, 144 (2014)
(explaining that "[tihe courts must persuade the people to take the position of
authorship [of the Constitution]; they must present the meaning of the text such
that the people can hold themselves accountable for this text").
75 See Kahn & Brennan-Marquez, supra note 74; at 144.
76 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 9 (tent. ed. 1958) (advocating for
background values as a check to statutory interpretation); Kahn & Brennan-
Martinez, supra note 74, at 140-44 (illustrating the same in contemporary
context).
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ocratic authority thus suggests different orientations in consti-
tutional and statutory interpretation.7 7 Even if we ultimately
conclude that the Constitution's claim to democratic authority
is fictive, that conclusion still has implications for interpreta-
tion. It means that arguments for attending to text have a
democratic grounding in statutory interpretation that they lack
in constitutional interpretation.
III
Let us now consider another ground of authority: the role
of law in creating continuity and stability in the legal order. To
be sure, continuity and stability are not the only virtues of law.
We also prize law that fosters innovation or justice, for in-
stance. But stability and continuity remain fundamental vir-
tues of legal arrangements. Perhaps most important for our
purposes, creating stability and continuity in a legal order is
also a ground for law's authority. That is, other things equal, a
reason to comply with a form of law is that it creates stability
and continuity.
Statutory law and the Constitution, however, have a differ-
ent relationship to stability and continuity. Part of the task of a
constitution and constitutionalism is to create a "stable frame-
work for the political and legal institutions of the country," 7
and to "preserve stability and continuity in the legal and politi-
cal structure."7 9 While constitutions are subject to adjustment
from time to time, to have a constitution is to recognize a form
of higher law that is not subject to the same vicissitudes as
ordinary lawmaking forms; constitutions may change, but a
constitution is designed to be relatively enduring. This is not to
deny, as Serkin and Tebbe importantly reveal, that many other
forms of law turn out to be just as enduring;8 0 nor is it to deny
that there are other forms of lawmaking that intend to con-
strain future majorities.1 But it still is the case that constitu-
tional law paradigmatically has the legal and political aim of
77 The Constitution might be thought to have a different kind of connection to
democracy, in particular by promoting the democratic process. In Divergence, I
consider process-based conceptions of the Constitution's authority and argue
that this role too pushes constitutional and statutory interpretation norms in
different directions. See Stack, Divergence, supra note 47, at 29-33.
78 Raz, supra note 59, at 153.
79 Id.
80 Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 51, at 753-59 (considering whether the Consti-
tution's interpretive exceptionalism can be rooted in its entrenching quality).
81 See generally Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sacks, Political Entrenchment
and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 402-08 (2015) (examining how politicians
employ functional entrenchment mechanisms in addition to the formal modes of
16772017]1 DEBATE
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constraining future majorities and thus creating stability and
continuity to a greater extent than statutory law.
This different connection of constitutional law and statu-
tory law to the values of stability and continuity also has impli-
cations for their elaboration. While the Constitution's role in
creating continuity does not specify a single interpretive
method for the Constitution,8 2 it makes a virtue of interpretive
approaches that constrain the pace of change from current
norms.83 Interpreting the Constitution to serve stability and
continuity recommends modes of elaboration of the Constitu-
tion's requirements that give substantial weight to the status
quo and require special justification for departures from It, and
even then, favor incremental and developmental changes. Fos-
tering stability and continuity thus provides a strong endorse-
ment of our common law style constitutional elaboration: our
common law constitutionalism gives a legal presumption in
favor of status quo norms and requires special justification for
an interpretation that results in a changed reading of what the
Constitution requires. From this perspective, it makes sense
that we identify our "constitutional law" with the judiciary's
precedential elaborations of the Constitution's requirements;
doing so is a way of promoting stability and continuity in our
constitutionalism.
Statutory law, in contrast, does not labor under the same
preservationist norms. When deciding whether to enact a new
statute, Congress faces no formal legal presumption in favor of
the existing law; so long as Congress acts constitutionally, it
need not provide special justification to change the law, much
less opt for more incremental as opposed to cross-cutting solu-
tions. So too, no requirement of special justification applies to
courts when they enforce new statutory requirements; their job
is to implement the statute, even if it involves making signifi-
cant changes in the law. In this way, the criteria for valid
change in statutory law and constitutional law differ. With
regard to statutory law, Congress may enact a new statute or
statutory amendment that dramatically changes the existing
law, and courts routinely enforce those changes without re-
quiring special justification. With regard to constitutional law,
outside of the rarity of constitutional amendment, the court's
criteria for recognizing and enforcing changed readings of the
entrenchment through rules governing elections and the processes for enacting
and repealing legislation).
82 Samaha, supra note 57, at 666.
83 Id.
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Constitution creates a presumption in favor of the status quo,
and requires special justification for change. In sum, constitu-
tional and statutory law labor under different criteria for valid
change: a preservationist norm that requires special justifica-
tion for change applies to constitutional law but not to statu-
tory law. In this way, stability and continuity ground different
norms of change for constitutional and statutory law.
It might be objected that this analysis relies on a false
comparison; it compares change in "constitutional law" as ar-
ticulated by the courts to change in "statutory law," including
when Congress enacts a new statute or amends an old one. I
think this comparison is defensible. First, consider Serkin and
Tebbe's usage. They do not distinguish between constitutional
interpretation, constitutional implementation, the Constitu-
tion, and constitutional law. For instance, Serkin and Tebbe
argue that "the meaning of constitutional provisions is con-
stantly changing" outside of Article V formal constitutional
amendments.4 In other words, they treat changes in the judi-
cial doctrines of constitutional law as changes in the Constitu-
tion. Thus the norms or arguments they refer to as
"constitutional argument" pertain to the specification or imple-
mentation of constitutional law, including, norms of precedent
which clearly do not pertain to "interpretation" in a narrower
sense. This inclusive, non-formalist stance towards the set of
norms that come within the dialogue of constitutional interpre-
tation is widely shared,8 5 and reflects the view that constitu-
tional law changes primarily through judicial decisions.
I have no objection to this broad view of what comes within
the domain of "constitutional interpretation and argument,"
but that same non-formalist stance should also apply when
considering what counts as tatutory interpretation and argu-
ment. If constitutional interpretation and argument includes
norms that apply to constitutional development and lawmak-
ing, then so too statutory interpretation and argument should
include norms that apply to statutory development and law-
making. Taking this functional stance with regard to both con-
stitutional and statutory law reveals that a preservationist
constraint has greater hold on our constitutional than statu-
tory law for the simple reason that change in constitutional law
84 Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 51, at 757.
85 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK 5 (2013) (noting that
constitutional interpretation often amounts to constitutional rulemaking and de-
clining to make a strict distinction between interpretation and implementation).
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is constrained by precedent whereas change in statutory law is
not.
Serkin and Tebbe might still object that they observe
courts applying a less stringent form of precedent with regard
to constitutional decisions than statutory ones, so doesn't that
suggest a greater preservationist norm with regard to statutory
law? This difference in the strength of precedent does not re-
veal that constitutional law is less preservationist han statu-
tory law. In all but the rarest occasions, the only way
constitutional law changes is through reversals of judicial pre-
cedent. Not so for statutory law. Congress regularly amends
statutes in ways that change prior statutory text and also over-
rules prior judicial constructions. So the black letter doctrine
that statutory precedent is stronger than constitutional prece-
dent does not negate the underlying point that a greater
preservationist norm applies to constitutional law and
elaboration.
To summarize, the difference in the roles of constitutional
and statutory law in creating stability and continuity justifies
divergence in their modes of elaboration. Constitutional law's
role justifies granting weight to current norms and requiring
special justification for change; that same preservationist norm
does not apply to statutory development. Put another way, a
legal presumption in favor of the status quo is intrinsic to con-
stitutional elaboration, but not to statutory law. Accordingly,
the challenge of accommodating change while preserving con-
tinuity and stability makes a distinctive demand on constitu-
tional elaboration.
IV
Serkin and Tebbe ask Is the Constitution Special? My re-
sponse is that to understand the Constitution's distinctiveness
requires comparing the grounds for the authority of statutory
and constitutional law. Constitutional and statutory law have
different claims to democratic authority and different connec-
tions to the values of stability and continuity. Even if these
particular grounds of authority do not constrain interpretive
choice for statutes or the Constitution to a single method, the
contrast suggests different orientations and guideposts in con-
stitutional and statutory interpretation. The contrast also sug-
gests justification for some of the divergence which Serkin and
Tebbe observe in current practice, including the greater role of
statutory text, the greater reliance on judicial decisions as the
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means of elaboration of the Constitution, and the different role 
for precedent. 
Suggesting that the interpretation of these two forms of law 
depends in part on their different sources of authority does not 
deny that at times it will be very difficult to distinguish consti­
tutional and statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation 
may be hard to distinguish from constitutional interpretation 
when, for instance, a court is construing a very old statute, 
written in general or aspirational terms, with a significant body 
of stable precedent elaborating it.86 More generally, to suggest 
that some aspects of the authority of constitutional and statu­
tory law diverge is not to deny that these two forms of legislated 
law may have some overlapping grounds of authority which 
might, in a given case, be more important than their differ­
ences. The basic point remains that the distinct authority and 
roles of constitutional and statutory law provides a foundation 
for divergence in their interpretation. 
86 See Primus, The Cost of Text, supra note 52, at 2 (arguing that when a 
domain is rich with case law the decision making typically will proceed on the 
basis of that case law, whether the matter concerns a statute or the Constitution). 
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NELL L. REV. 701 (2016).
88 See id. at 708-49.
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